G. Zlotkin and J.S. Rosenschein, Compromise in negotiation; exploiting worth function over states  by unknown
190 Forthcoming Papers/Art@ial Intelligence 83 (1996) 189-191 
device functions. We make four important contributions. First, we present a representation of class level 
descriptions of model fragments and their relationships. The representation yields a practical model fragment 
library organization that facilitates knowledge base construction and supports focused generation of device 
models. Second, we show how the structural, behavioral, and functional contexts of the device define model 
adequacy and provide the task focus and additional constraints to guide the search for adequate models. Third, 
we describe a novel model selection algorithm that incorporates device behavior with order of magnitude 
reasoning and focuses model selection with component interaction heuristics. Fourth, we present the results of 
our implementation that produces adequate models and causal explanations of a variety of electromechanical 
devices drawn from a library of 20 components and 150 model fragments. 
G. Zlotkin and J.S. Rosenschein, Compromise in negotiation: exploiting worth 
functions over state5 
Previous work (G. Zlotkin and J.S. Rosenschein ( 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992)) discussed inter-agent negotiation 
protocols. One of the main assumptions there was that the agents’ goals remain fixed-the agents cannot relax 
their initial goals, which can be achieved only as a whole and cannot be partially achieved. A goal there was 
considered a formula that is either satisfied or not satisfied by a given state. 
We here present a more general approach to the negotiation problem in non-cooperative domains where 
agents’ goals are not expressed as formulas, but rather as worth funcfions. An agent associates a particular 
value with each possible final state; this value reflects the degree of satisfaction the agent derives from being 
in that state. 
With this new definition of goal as worth function, an agreement may lead to a situation in which one 
or both goals are only partially achieved (i.e., agents may not reach their most desired state). We present a 
negotiation protocol that can be used in a general non-cooperative domain when worth functions are available. 
This multi-plan deal type allows agents to compromise over their degree of satisfaction, and (in parallel) 
to negotiate over the joint plan that will be implemented to reach the compromise final state. The ability to 
compromise often results in a better deal, enabling agents to increase their overall utility. 
Finally, we present more detailed examples of specific worth functions in various domains, and show how 
they are used in the negotiation process. 
R. Hirsch, Relation algebras of intervals 
Given a representation of a relation algebra we construct relation algebras of pairs and of intervals. If the 
representation happens to be complete, homogeneous and fully universal then the pair and interval algebras 
can be constructed direct from the relation algebra. If, further, the original relation algebra is w-categorical we 
show that the interval algebra is too. The complexity of relation algebras is studied and it is shown that every 
pair algebra with infinite representations is intractable. Applications include constructing an interval algebra 
that combines metric and interval expressivity. 
S. Kraus, An overview of incentive contracting 
Agents may contract some of their tasks to other agents even when they do not share a common goal. An 
agent may try to contract some of the tasks that it cannot perform by itself, or that may be performed more 
efficiently by other agents. One self-motivated agent may convince another self-motivated agent to help it 
with its task, by promises of rewards, even if the agents are not assumed to be benevolent. We propose 
techniques that provide efficient ways for agents to make incentive contracts in varied situations: when agents 
have full information about the environment and each other, or when agents do not know the exact state of the 
world. We consider situations of repeated encounters, cases of asymmetric information, situations where the 
agents lack information about each other, and cases where an agent subcontracts a task to a group of agents. 
